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Abstract 
 
Hackers frequently use social engineering attacks to gain a foothold into a target network.  
This type of attack is a tremendous challenge to defend against, as the weakness lies in the 
human users, not in the technology.  Thus far, methods for dealing with this threat have 
included establishing better security policies and educating users on the threat that exists.  
Existing techniques aren’t working as evidenced by the fact that auditing agencies consider it 
a given that will be able to gain access via social engineering.  The purpose of this research is 
to propose a better method of reducing an individual’s vulnerability to social engineering 
attacks.   
The first part of the research formally establishes the connection between social engineering 
attacks and what social psychologists call, “illegitimate persuasion” using content analysis to 
show that both target the same common psychological triggers.  This comparison is done by 
comparing specific examples in different mediums.  Once this connection is established, this 
research also proposes how to apply specific techniques that have been shown to be effective 
in increasing an individual’s resistance to persuasion.  Specifically, it uses techniques that 
have been shown to be effective in bolstering an individual’s resistance illegitimate 
persuasion.  The research culminates in the proposal of a template for a training program 
using these new techniques that can be incorporated into existing training classes that should 
significantly reduce an individual’s vulnerability to social engineering attacks. 
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ESTABLISHING THE HUMAN FIREWALL: REDUCING AN INDIVIDUAL’S 
VULNERABILITY TO SOCIAL ENGINEERING 
I. Introduction 
 
1.1   Overview 
 
Human users are the weakest link in any given information security system (Mitnick and 
Simon, 2002); they can be deceived, tricked, and manipulated into circumventing the security 
protocols in place.  As technology progresses, it is this human weakness that remains the 
most challenging aspect of system security.  Mitnick describes the techniques used to exploit 
this human vulnerability to bypass security systems in order to gather information as “social 
engineering” (Mitnick and Simon, 2002).  Human users create holes in even the most 
expensive and well thought-out hardware and software protection system to such a point that, 
when conducting an audit of a company’s information security policies, some security 
consultants consider it a given that they would be able to gain access to guarded information 
via social engineering (Gragg, 2003).  Each new generation of technology promises a new 
and improved level of security, but as Peltier points out, the 1970s promised access control 
packages to make systems secure, the 1980s promised that effective anti-virus software 
would make systems secure, the 1990s promised that firewalls would make systems secure, 
and here in the 21st century, the promise is that intrusion detection systems and public key 
infrastructure are what’s going to make our systems secure (Peltier, 2006).  All may prove 
ineffective as attack technologies and techniques continue to evolve and adapt to new 
technology, but one method of attacking a network has remained constant, the attack on the 
users.  As security technology improves its ability to keep out those who would infiltrate the 
network, perpetrators likely will simply shift their focus to the human user in order to gain 
access.  Ironically, this human aspect of security has in the past been largely ignored or 
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downplayed as being too difficult a problem to solve. The purpose of this thesis is to develop 
a means of framing and solving the social engineering problem.   
1.2   Recognizing the Threat 
 
Many organizations, including the Air Force, use vulnerability assessment teams that use 
all the tricks and tactics that a perpetrator would to conduct internal audits on their defenses.  
These so-called “red teams” almost always use social engineering techniques to create an 
initial point of entry into a network and then use that entry point as a jumping off point in 
order to work their way further in the organization’s physical and network resources.  Once 
inside, the red teams can extract information or plant programs that create backdoors into the 
network for later use.  Anecdotal evidence from interviews with past and present members of 
these red teams has indicated that these teams gain access to a network 100 percent of the 
time via social engineering techniques—social engineering always works!  The threat of 
social engineering cannot be overstated, as it is an insidious, difficult-to-detect method of 
gaining access to information or resources that otherwise would be considered well-protected.  
An attack may consist of gaining seemingly innocuous information, combining it with 
seemingly innocuous information gathered from another source and suddenly some critical 
bit of information is revealed than can be used to exploit even more information from an 
unsuspecting user.  This linkage can be seen in Figure 1, an illustration from a 1995 article on 
social engineering by Winkler and Dealy (1995).  What this image helps to illustrate is that a 
determined social engineer is rarely after a single piece of information, but rather gathers 
what she can, when she can and then combines the collected pieces of information into a 
potential attack vector.   
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FIGURE 1: ANATOMY OF AN ATTACK (WINKLER AND DEALY, 1995) 
 
1.3   Psychology and Social Engineering 
 
The exact tactics and techniques used by social engineers are constantly evolving, but the 
common thread among the many techniques of social engineering is that they target certain 
“psychological triggers” to accomplish their objectives (Gragg, 2003, Rusch, 1999).  Trade 
literature and general practitioner attitudes highlight the importance of user education and 
strong security policies as primary methods for defense against social engineering attacks 
(Gragg, 2003, Granger, 2002, Mitnick and Simon, 2002), but the continuing vulnerability of 
organizations despite the implementation of these policies indicate that something further is 
needed.  Additional methods to combat social engineering are clearly needed, and need to be 
fielded as soon as possible.  One area of study that may help in uncovering a better method of 
combating social engineering is the field of psychology, specifically social psychology.   
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Gragg (2003) has described several psychological triggers or vulnerabilities that social 
engineers exploit to create an emotional state in an individual that leaves them willing to 
grant access to information that would otherwise be protected.  Inherent in the use of these 
triggers is deception.  In almost every social engineering attack, the perpetrator wants the 
victim to believe the perpetrator is someone they are not.  Similarly, a form of persuasion that 
has been termed “illegitimate persuasion” by Dr. Brad Sagarin and his colleagues, is when a 
message seeks “to convince through the use of deceptive tactics” such as having an actor 
dressed as a stock broker who recommends a particular brokerage firm, when in fact, the 
actor has no specific expertise to make such a recommendation (Sagarin et al., 2002).  This 
concept dovetails well with the definition of social engineering. A key difference is that with 
illegitimate persuasion, the objective typically is to convince an individual to buy something, 
whereas with social engineering, the desired objective is convincing an individual to reveal 
sensitive information or bypass established security controls.   
1.4  Resistance to Persuasion & Social Engineering 
 
Persuasion is fundamental to human interaction, and social psychologists have long been 
interested in understanding which persuasive tactics are effective and why.  Considerable 
research has looked at the forms of persuasion (Cialdini, 1993, Cialdini, 2001), while in 
contrast, relatively few have examined persuasion defenses.  The forms of defense against 
persuasion that have been defined are based largely on the work of McGuire, who proposed 
an inoculation defense (McGuire, 1964), as well as research done by Petty and Caciappo on 
forewarning (Petty and Caciappo, 1977).  Of these two persuasion defense theories, the 
inoculation theory appears to have possible applications to building a defense against social 
engineering.  McGuire’s inoculation theory suggests that individuals become resistant to 
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social influences when they are exposed to less severe threats, and mirrors the medical 
practice of exposing a patient to a reduced concentration of a disease to build up antibodies to 
counter that disease. Moreover, an extension of McGuire’s inoculation theory has been 
effective against illegitimate persuasion in an experimental setting (Sagarin et al., 2002) 
which showed that dispelling any illusions of invulnerability that an individual has is 
necessary to increasing an individual’s resistance.   
1.5  Academic Challenges of Studying Social Engineering 
 
While trade literature on social engineering is plentiful, the topic is a difficult problem to 
tackle in an academic setting.  Techniques of social engineering are observed only after an 
attack has been attempted and detected, which often makes it difficult to consult the 
perpetrator on his cognitive processes leading up to the attack.  There is also the problem that 
successful attacks may never be detected, and therefore the technique for such an attack 
might never be revealed.  This is why material from reformed former practitioners of social 
engineering, such as Kevin Mitnick, is so valuable.  Research can also run into ethical issues, 
as human subject testing review boards tend to frown on experiments that, as a fundamental 
part of the experiment, seek to deceive the participants as to the true nature of the study.  
Also, any research of a phenomenon requires an effective measurement tool, and while one 
has been proposed for social engineering (Nohlberg, 2005), it is problematic in that it requires 
the users to be deceived as to the true nature of the study, and that it has yet to be validated 
through repeated experiments.  That problem may not be able to be easily overcome, as 
deception is central to the success of social engineering, and it is the individual’s 
susceptibility to deception that a researcher would be trying to obtain.  Without an effective 
measurement instrument, it becomes quite difficult for researchers to determine whether a 
proposed defensive mechanism is effective, because there is no means to compare the before 
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and after.  The cumulative effect of all these challenges combined has left the academic 
literature on social engineering a relatively barren landscape.   
1.6   Purpose Statement 
 
Given the relative dearth of research in social engineering when compared to the research 
on persuasion, research that defines the relationship between social engineering and 
illegitimate persuasion might allow techniques described by researchers on how to bolster an 
individual’s resistance to illegitimate persuasion to be applied towards increasing an 
individual’s resistance to social engineering.  The first purpose of this paper is to establish a 
link between social engineering and illegitimate persuasion.  If this link can be established, it 
stands to reason that techniques demonstrated in social psychology to be effective against 
illegitimate persuasion can be incorporated into a training program that can be expected to 
increase an individual’s resistance to social engineering.  If the link is shown to be weak or 
non-existent, then another approach to developing a program to reduce the organization’s 
vulnerability to social engineering attacks will need to be developed. 
1.7  Thesis Organization 
 
This paper is organized as follows:  Chapter two reviews a variety of relevant research 
that has been done on social engineering, persuasion and resistance to persuasion.  Chapter 
three details the comparison that was made between social engineering and illegitimate 
persuasion.  Chapter four outlines how techniques designed to reduce an individual’s 
vulnerability to a social engineering attempt can be applied from research on persuasion.  
Chapter five discusses areas for follow up study as well as potential other areas of application 
for this research. 
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II. Literature Review 
 
This chapter is an overview of the concepts associated with social engineering and 
persuasion.  First, the background of social engineering and how psychology previously has 
been researched in relation to social engineering is reviewed.  Persuasion models are then 
reviewed to give some background on how persuasion might tie into social engineering.  
Finally, literature that deals specifically on how to develop a resistance to persuasion is 
reviewed for its potential applicability to social engineering. 
2.1  What is meant by the term, “Social Engineering”? 
 
Social engineering has been broadly defined as a set of behaviors used by criminals to 
surreptitiously gain access to proprietary and confidential information systems (Chantler and 
Broadhurst, 2006, Granger, 2001).  Some behaviors defined as social engineering may be 
unobtrusive, with no personal interaction occurring between the perpetrator and the 
information system user.  Some examples of unobtrusive behavior that can be labeled as 
social engineering include dumpster diving and reading the names off a building’s 
information board.  While these activities may fit into the broad definition of social 
engineering, this paper will focus on social engineering behaviors that are more obtrusive, 
where the perpetrator interacts directly with the victim, using psychological tricks or 
manipulations to deceive the victim into volunteering information or somehow yielding 
access to the system.  This kind of social engineering can be anything from an authoritative 
phone call placed to an unsuspecting user, to impersonating tech support and paying a 
personal visit to “install the latest patches.”   For the purposes of this paper, the definition of 
social engineering will refer to this personal approach to social engineering, for two reasons.  
First, it is the more insidious and pervasive type of social engineering security professionals 
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face today and second, it is the one that might be effectively countered with the appropriate 
level of training and education. 
2.2   Trade Literature and Social Engineering 
 
Much has been written in trade literature about social engineering.  Works such as 
Granger’s articles on securityfocus.com (2001, 2002, 2006), Gragg’s article published by the 
SANS Institute (Gragg, 2003), and a book by one of the most infamous hackers that has since 
reformed, Kevin Mitnick (Mitnick and Simon, 2002), clearly define the threat that 
organizations face when trying to protect sensitive information.  Mitnick, in particular, offers 
numerous anecdotes to illustrate the various techniques and methods that a social engineer 
can employ to gather the sought-after information (Mitnick and Simon, 2002).  While most 
trade literature on social engineering does an excellent job of outlining the threat that is faced, 
the techniques described to combat the threat are fairly universal throughout trade literature.   
2.3  Current Preventive Techniques are Inadequate 
 
The universal theme in the trade literature is that social engineering is a problem that is 
never given enough attention by organizational decision makers (Granger, 2006, Peltier, 
2006) and that the best way to defend against it is through user awareness and stringent 
security policies (Chantler and Broadhurst, 2006, Gragg, 2003, Granger, 2006, Mitnick and 
Simon, 2002, Peltier, 2006, Rusch, 1999).  Authors such as Thornburgh emphasize well-
defined policies that establishes an information classification system that clearly defines not 
only what information can be disclosed but to whom and by whom as well as education 
policies that instruct users about what information a social engineer can use, how she gains it, 
and how it can be used towards nefarious ends (Thornburgh, 2004).  While these programs 
and policies certainly are useful at face value in developing a defense against social 
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engineering, the problem is that they have been shown to be inadequate, to the point that 
many security consultants consider it a given that they will be able to access critical 
information via social engineering (Gragg, 2003).  This is backed up from discussions with 
individuals of red teams who engage in social engineering behaviors regularly in the course 
of their attempts to penetrate a network, and who reveal that their attempts to gain 
information and/or access via social engineering are effective 100 percent of the time.  
Usually the victims are all too willing to give up the desired information, and the few who 
actually do challenge the red teams are usually circumvented simply by changing the attack 
vector, either by attacking another individual, or by switching tactics.   
2.4   Psychological Triggers Introduced 
 
Several researchers have tried to better understand why current efforts are inadequate 
against the threat of social engineering.  Some of these efforts have focused on the 
psychological vulnerabilities of individuals (Chantler and Broadhurst, 2006, Gragg, 2003, 
Rusch, 1999).  Gragg (2003) perhaps made the largest contribution to the literature on the 
psychological aspects of social engineering when he defined seven psychological triggers that 
perpetrators can potentially use to manipulate a victim into revealing the desired information.  
He labeled these triggers as follows: strong affect, overloading, reciprocation, deceptive 
relationships, diffusion of responsibility, authority, and integrity and consistency.  Gaining an 
understanding of these triggers as well as the techniques used to carry out a social 
engineering attack is fundamental to being able to develop a defense against the pervasive 
threat of social engineering.   
These triggers are all based on deception, and used by a perpetrator towards a single end: 
convincing the victim that his or her intentions are benevolent and should be trusted.  Once 
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the victim is sufficiently convinced, the perpetrator generally has no problems obtaining the 
desired information from the victim.  Persuasion and deception are central to a successful 
social engineering attack, and for that reason, understanding persuasion, deception, and the 
resistance of persuasion is central to finding an effective defense against social engineering.  
An investigation into social psychology may reveal the best answer as to why previous 
methods of instilling a resistance to social engineering have proved inadequate and to how 
best combat the threat of social engineering.   
2.5   Cialdini and the Six Principles of Persuasion  
 
When studying the effects and methods of persuasion, researchers over the years have 
given priority to the study of successful persuasion (getting someone to say yes), rather than 
on the study of resistance to persuasion (getting someone to say no).  This is primarily due to 
an overwhelming interest and sponsorship by advertisers in getting the individual to say yes 
to a particular product or service.  One of the results of such work on persuasion was 
Cialdini’s (1993, 2001) six persuasion principles that can be used to describe nearly any 
attempt at persuasion.  These principles describe the tendency of individuals to react 
favorably to stimuli related to each principle.  These principles have been described as 
“heuristic rules” that can assist individuals in their decision whether or not to comply with a 
request (Cialdini, 1993).  The six principles described by Cialdini are authority, consistency, 
liking, reciprocity, scarcity, and social proof.  The following paragraph describes each in 
more detail. 
The principle of authority states that when making a decision, it is common to look to 
expert advice from an acknowledged source.  Authority can be represented effectively simply 
through the external appearance of authority through specific symbols, such as a uniform, 
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professional title, etc (Bickman, 1974).  Another factor that can affect the likelihood of 
compliance is the legitimacy and credibility of the authority figure.  The principle of 
consistency is based on the desire of individuals to uphold their stated commitments.  This 
tendency is even stronger when a person’s values are identified first and the communicator is 
then able to point out that the request is consistent with those values (Cialdini, 2001).  People 
feel obligated to back up their initial commitment with action, and this tendency can be used 
as a means of persuasion.  The principle of liking refers to the tendency of people to respond 
positively to a request from someone they like.  There are numerous factors that can enhance 
the effect, such as similarity of attitude, background, physical attractiveness, dress, and the 
use of praise (Cialdini, 1993).  The principle of reciprocity is based on the tendency of 
individuals to respond in kind when positive behavior is received, such as the giving of gifts, 
favors, or services.  The principle of scarcity refers to the fact that as items or opportunities 
are perceived to be more scarce, they are perceived to be more valuable, and thus can be 
leveraged into convincing an individual into a course of action.  The last principle that 
Cialdini describes is the principle of social proof, which refers to the tendency of people to 
follow the lead of their peers, and that others’ standards are often adopted as an individual’s 
own.  This can be leveraged into a willingness to comply with a request when supported by 
the belief that similar peers comply with it as well.   These six principles appear to have some 
significant overlaps with Gragg’s psychological triggers.  Cialdini’s principles and Gragg’s 
triggers are compared in depth and in parallel in chapter four.   
2.6   Resistance to Persuasion 
 
Given the focus of this research, our emphasis will be on demonstrated methods for 
resisting persuasion.  Tormala and Petty (2004) define resistance to persuasion as “the 
process of defending one’s attitude against persuasive attack.”  Other mechanisms through 
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which individuals resist persuasion that have been studied include counter arguing, which 
Brock described as the “act of generating behavioral cognitive responses against a message” 
(Brock, 1967).  Lydon, Zanna, and Ross (1988) contributed to the resistance to persuasion 
literature by showing that it was related to bolstering an individual’s initial attitudes.   It has 
also been shown that individuals resist persuasion when they have been forewarned 
(Papageorgis, 1968, Petty and Caciappo, 1977), and when they have been previously exposed 
to initial attacks of persuasion (McGuire, 1964).   
More recently, Tormala and Petty (2002) showed that when individuals resist a 
persuasive attack, those attacks can actually make the target’s ability to resist attack stronger 
than it already was.  These finding were consistent with McGuire’s inoculation theory 
(McGuire, 1964), which showed that exposure to an initial persuasive attack can increase an 
individual’s resistance to subsequent attacks.  McGuire’s research focused on cultural 
truisms, which he believed to be a particular vulnerable set of beliefs that people had little 
experience defending against.  He found that individuals who were given the motivation to 
defend their attitudes, and the ability to do so effectively by a defense that effectively refuted 
a weakened argument for a cultural truism, were much more likely to have a significant and 
long-lasting resistance.  McGuire’s research assumed, though, that initial attitudes were 
unchanged.  Where Tormala and Petty differ is when they showed that those initial attitudes 
do indeed change, and that the credibility of the source of a persuasive attack affects the 
predictability of an individual being able to resist a persuasive attack (Tormala and Petty, 
2004).   
Tormala and Petty demonstrated (2004) that when an attack from what is perceived to be 
an expert is successfully resisted, an individual’s attitude of certainty of being able to resist 
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future attack is increased.  When applied towards training individuals and creating a 
predictable behavior in them, this increased certainty could be useful, leading trainees to a 
sense of invulnerability.  According to Sagarin, et al (2002), the greatest increase in 
resistance occurs when that sense of invulnerability is shown to be erroneous.  Sagarin and 
his colleagues expanded on McGuire’s inoculation theory, and demonstrated in a series of 
three experiments that instilling resistance requires more than just asserting an individual’s 
vulnerability.  Instead, the individual’s vulnerability must be demonstrated in order to 
significantly increase their resistance—that is, the person must have an “a ha!” moment.  
Applying this technique to social engineering, means that in order to effectively train an 
individual to be resistant to social engineering, that individual must be shown that he or she is 
vulnerable to the techniques used by social engineers.  Using the techniques developed by 
Tormala and Petty to ensure that an individual is confident in their ability to resist an expertly 
executed persuasive attack, and thus seemingly invulnerable to further attacks sets a perfect 
stage for dispelling that illusion of invulnerability and thus increasing their resistance to 
further persuasion.  
Sagarin and his colleagues conducted three different experiments on resistance to 
illegitimate persuasion, and the results of each experiment has lessons that can be used 
towards instilling a resistance to social engineering (Sagarin et al., 2002).  I will take a 
moment here to describe the experiments, the results of each, and the potential application to 
social engineering.  
2.7   Sagarin’s Experiments and Their Application to Social Engineering 
 
The first experiment attempted to “instill resistance by teaching participants a rule for 
discriminating between legitimate and illegitimate appeals and by suggesting to participants 
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that ads containing illegitimate authorities are attempts to deceive consumers” (Sagarin et al., 
2002).  The results of this experiment suggested that simply giving trainees a discriminating 
rule did not make them significantly more resistant to an authority-based appeal.  The 
participants did become more discriminating about discerning an illegitimate authority from a 
legitimate authority, but the experiment rather showed that legitimate authorities came to be 
seen as more persuasive, rather than instilling a strong resistance against illegitimate 
authorities (Sagarin et al., 2002).  The extension and application for this finding for the 
purposes of training individuals about social engineering is that teaching individuals about 
the various psychological triggers simply isn’t enough to instill an effective resistance and 
defense to social engineering.  This finding explains why education programs that simply 
seek to inform the user about the dangers of social engineering have proven ineffective.   
The second experiment that Sagarin and his colleagues conducted essentially replicated 
the first experiment, with one key difference: persistence of the desired effect over time 
(Sagarin et al., 2002).  In addition to testing the participants’ resistance to illegitimate 
persuasion immediately after applying their treatment, the second experiment also tested the 
participants’ resistance one to four days after the treatment was applied.  The findings of this 
second experiment matched the findings of the first experiment in that the participants were 
found not to have as much an increase in resistance against illegitimate authorities as an 
increased perception that the legitimate authority was more persuasive.  The participants who 
received the treatment did not resist illegitimate authorities more effectively than did the 
controls (Sagarin et al., 2002).  For the purpose of applying Sagarin’s techniques to social 
engineering, there were two important findings from the second experiment.  First, the effects 
of the treatment did appear to persist over time (Sagarin et al., 2002).  That the effects 
persisted over time suggests that a more formal, interactive training program against social 
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engineering could be effective for a time after being taught.  Second, that the participants 
appeared to recognize the characterization of illegitimacy in the treatment, but appeared to 
believe themselves unsusceptible to its effects and thus did not act on it (Sagarin et al., 2002).  
This illusion of invulnerability has been studied in areas from contraception (Burger and 
Burns, 1988), to mental health (Taylor and Gollwitzer, 1995), to preventative health 
behaviors (Weinstein, 1987) and has been found to persist even to the individual’s detriment.  
This illusion of invulnerability helps to explain why individuals continue to be vulnerable to 
social engineering attacks even after the current techniques of training are administered.   
The third experiment that Sagarin and his colleagues conducted sought to dispel these 
illusions of invulnerability by demonstrating to the participants who had been persuaded by 
an illegitimate authority that they had been fooled (Sagarin et al., 2002).  By pointing out to 
the participants that they had been duped, the participants learned that they were personally 
susceptible to the risk of illegitimate persuasion.  The results of the experiment suggested that 
participants who had their personal vulnerability demonstrated to them were significantly 
more resistant to ads containing illegitimate authorities than those who did not have their 
personal vulnerability demonstrated, and were again more persuaded by legitimate 
authorities.  This experiment was the first time in the series of experiments that the resistance 
effect was of greater magnitude than the enhancement effect (Sagarin et al., 2002).  This 
demonstrated conclusively that instilling resistance required more than merely asserting an 
individual’s vulnerability; it requires a clear demonstration of this vulnerability (Sagarin et 
al., 2002).   
 
  
16 
III. Methodology 
 
This chapter outlines the methodology used to formally compare social engineering and 
illegitimate persuasion.  It provides the necessary information to formalize the relationship in 
a systematic and definable manner.   
3.1   Problem Definition 
 
This research addresses two specific areas of concern about social engineering: 
determining whether or not social engineering can be equated to illegitimate persuasion, and 
how to apply techniques shown to be effective against illegitimate persuasion to the problem 
of training someone to be resistant to social engineering. 
3.2  Goals  
 
In order to be able to apply Sagarin’s work on illegitimate persuasion to social 
engineering, the goal of this research is to determine whether or not social engineering is 
actually comparable enough to illegitimate persuasion to be able to make the transfer of this 
application to social engineering.   
3.3    Approach 
 
This comparison was performed in two phases.  First, Gragg’s psychological triggers 
were directly compared to Cialdini’s principles of persuasion.  This was done to determine 
whether techniques of persuasion are the same as the techniques of social engineering.  Then 
in the second phase, a systematic, progressive comparison was performed between each of 
the following aspects of the two: definitions, targets, objectives, and methods of illegitimate 
persuasion and social engineering, as shown in Figure 2.  The experiments that Sagarin and 
his colleagues performed during their research on illegitimate persuasion are analyzed for the 
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principles of persuasion methods that they used, and for the comparable psychological 
triggers that were used.  One set of experiments focused on the persuasion principle of 
authority, while the other experiment focused on the principle of scarcity.  If the principle of 
dispelling the illusion of invulnerability works against two separate principles of persuasion, 
and those principles of persuasion are equated to the psychological triggers of social 
engineering, then the principle of dispelling the illusion of invulnerability should be 
applicable to all of the principles of persuasion and, by extension, any psychological triggers 
that the principles of persuasion are found to be the same as. 
   
FIGURE 2: COMPARISON METHODOLOGY 
 
This comparison sets the foundation for the training proposal that follows in chapter five 
and would indicate that the development of a training program designed to instill a resistance 
to social engineering based on Sagarin’s principles of dispelling the illusion of invulnerability 
in individuals is a viable method of reducing an individual’s resistance to social engineering.  
This type of training would be a revolutionary approach to developing a defense against 
social engineering, which up to this point has involved comprehensive security policies and 
education on the methods of techniques and tactics of social engineers, but the current 
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education plans does not address what is a necessary step towards increasing someone’s 
resistance to a social engineering attempt:  the cognitive recognition by the individual that 
they are vulnerable to the techniques and tactics commonly used by social engineers, and that 
the information that individual possesses is valuable to a social engineer, and likely to be 
targeted.   
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IV. Results and Analysis 
4.1   Comparing Psychological Triggers to Principles of Persuasion 
 
In order to compare Gragg’s psychological triggers to Cialdini’s principles of persuasion, 
each of Cialdini’s principles will be described, followed by any comparable trigger that 
Gragg describes.  This comparison will assist in the analysis of the methods of both 
illegitimate persuasion and social engineering.  Gragg describes seven psychological triggers 
of social engineering, while Cialdini describes six principles of persuasion, shown in Figure 
3. 
 
FIGURE 3: CIALDINI'S PRINCIPLES OF PERSUASION & GRAGG'S PSYCHOLOGICAL TRIGGERS 
 
The first psychological trigger described by Gragg is strong affect (Gragg, 2003).  This is 
a technique that uses a heightened emotional state that allows the perpetrator to get 
information from a victim that would not normally be released.  According to Gragg (2003), 
when employing this technique, the perpetrator will trigger the desired emotion, such as 
greed, at the outset of the encounter to distract the victim, and interfere with their ability to 
evaluate, think logically, or develop counterarguments.  A good example of a social 
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engineering attack that uses principles of strong affect is the classic phishing attack that 
claims that a user’s banking account information has been compromised.  The strong affect 
emotion this type of attack seeks to elicit is one of fear that their financial information is in 
the hands of a thief.   
The first principle of persuasion that was examined was the principle of scarcity 
(Cialdini, 2001).  Scarcity refers to the natural inclination to desire things that are rare or 
scarce.  It can also refer to the desire to miss out on future opportunities.  An example of a 
persuasion attempt that uses the principle of scarcity is an advertisement that touts a “limited-
time offer” or “while supplies last.”  The implication of these examples is that there is a finite 
amount of time that the product will be available, and any purchase of said product should be 
done quickly.  Like the social engineer in Gragg’s trigger of strong affect, an advertiser who 
uses the scarcity principle to persuade is hoping to elicit a strong emotion that temporarily 
impairs their judgment.  In analyzing the relationship between the trigger of strong affect and 
the principle of scarcity, it would seem that strong affect can be more broadly applied, and 
that nearly every circumstance of scarcity fits into the trigger of strong affect.   
The second trigger Gragg describes is overloading; this is a technique where the 
perpetrator presents false premises that are laced with convincing truisms to the victim in 
such rapid succession that the victim becomes mentally passive or when a perpetrator argues 
from an unexpected perspective and the victim becomes more willing to accept arguments 
that should have been challenged (Gragg, 2003).  There is a time element with the 
overloading trigger during which the victim is either passive or compliant and the perpetrator 
acts quickly to take advantage of the victim’s reduced motivation to resist.  This attack is 
usually conducted over the phone or, even better, in person to reduce the victim’s ability to 
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react and retreat before being forced into making a decision.  It can also be used to gain 
compliance in a small task and set up an attack using a different trigger (such as 
reciprocation).  None of Cialdini’s principles of persuasion appear to match this trigger. 
The third trigger that Gragg describes is that of reciprocation, a technique based on the 
idea of social exchange where individuals feel obligated to reciprocate a kind gesture from 
someone else (Gragg, 2003).  Also referred to as “reverse social engineering” (Granger, 
2001), an example of this type of reciprocation is when the perpetrator creates an IT problem 
that baffles the user, but he or she just happens to be able to fix.  When the perpetrator 
voluntarily helps to fix the problem, he or she asks the victim to reciprocate by innocently 
requesting otherwise guarded information.   
Reciprocation is a well-established persuasion principle, and is described by Cialdini 
using the exact same term (Cialdini, 2001).  He describes it as a response to positive behavior 
with positive behavior return, linked to the human need to establish strong social networks 
(Cialdini, 2001).  The caveat with this principle is that according to Brehm’s theory of 
reactance, the initial behavior has to appear genuine, given upfront, and unconditionally or 
the recipient quickly becomes defensive and guarded (Brehm, 1966).   
The fourth trigger that Gragg describes is the deceptive relationship, a technique where 
the perpetrator purposefully builds up a relationship with the intent to eventually extract 
information out of the victim(s) (Gragg, 2003).  Mitnick and Simon (Mitnick and Simon, 
2002) describe deceptive relationships with an anecdote where an employee who already was 
suspicious of Mitnick in a different context was conned.  Mitnick took on an alias via email 
and developed a relationship with the employee by sharing with the employee his distrust and 
 
  
22 
negative impressions of “Kevin Mitnick”.  With an established relationship, Mitnick was able 
to pump the employee for all kinds of information (Mitnick and Simon, 2002).   
This trigger fits well with the persuasion principle that Cialdini terms liking (Cialdini, 
2001).  Liking is described as a positive connection between people, and can be fostered in a 
number of ways including physical attractiveness, similarity, compliments and cooperation 
(Cialdini, 2001).  This principle and the trigger of deceptive relationships are based on the 
same desired attitudes from the individual, and can be considered one and the same.  
The fifth trigger Gragg describes is the diffusion of responsibility and moral duty, a 
technique where the social engineer manipulates the target into believing that he or she will 
not be held solely responsible for his or her actions and that those actions will have a 
significant positive consequence, such as saving an employee or helping the company 
(Gragg, 2003).  This trigger is one where the victim realizes the action being solicited is 
against policy or otherwise prohibited, but proceeds anyway because of a perceived greater 
benefit.  Based on this description, this trigger does not appear to have a corresponding 
principle of persuasion. 
The sixth trigger described by Gragg is response to authority.  This is a technique that 
preys on an individual’s propensity to respond and comply with someone who claims to be an 
authority figure (Gragg, 2003).  Compounding the effectiveness of this trigger is that 
verifying the legitimacy of the authority is considered a challenge, and one that most people 
are not willing to make.  Organizations with very rigid hierarchal structures are particularly 
vulnerable to this type of attack, the military being the most obvious example.  A social 
engineer might exploit this trigger by pretending to be a high-ranking officer in the military, 
or some other authority figure and simply request the information he desires.  This trigger is 
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another example of one that overlaps perfectly with one of Cialdini’s principles of 
persuasion.  Cialdini’s principle notes that it is common to seek expert advice, and specific 
symbols of authorities such as uniforms and professional titles only serve to enhance the 
effect (Cialdini, 2001).   
Finally, the last psychological trigger that Gragg describes is integrity and consistency, 
which takes advantage of the target’s desire to follow through on commitments in order to 
manipulate them into performing some action (Gragg, 2003).  This technique targets an 
individual’s perceived obligation to follow through on promises, even if the promises made 
were not their own.  For example, if an employee were to go on vacation and a perpetrator 
presented a victim with a promise by the employee to provide specific information, the victim 
will often give up the information if they can be convinced (or convince themselves) the 
promise was legitimate.  This trigger also covers the nature of people to trust others because 
they believe the person is telling the truth, based on their own tendency towards honesty.  
This last psychological trigger matches Cialdini’s principle of persuasion of commitment and 
consistency, which is linked to an individual’s desire to be, or at least appear to be, consistent 
(Cialdini, 2001).  Cialdini notes that this desire is even stronger when a person’s values are 
identified first.  For this principle to work well, an initial commitment has to be obtained, and 
a social engineer could exploit this using reciprocation, or overloading. 
4.2   Comparing Definitions of Illegitimate Persuasion and Social Engineering 
 
The definitions used for comparing illegitimate persuasion and social engineering were 
taken from two of the most influential articles about each subject.  Dr. Sagarin’s and his 
colleagues’ definition of illegitimate persuasion was used in order to be consistent, as his 
article was the basis of this comparison.  Sagarin defines illegitimate persuasion as “messages 
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that seek to convince through deceptive tactics” (Sagarin et al., 2002).  In the article that 
Gragg describes the psychological triggers of social engineering, he defines social 
engineering as “the process of deceiving people into giving away access or confidential 
information” (Gragg, 2003).   
When comparing Gragg’s definition of social engineering and Sagarin’s definition of 
illegitimate persuasion, what immediately jumps out from these two definitions is that 
deception is fundamental to both.  Sagarin’s definition of illegitimate persuasion implies that 
the deception is purposeful and intentional, while Gragg’s definition of social engineering 
leaves less room for interpretation.  By his definition, social engineering is a designed, 
purposeful “process” that leaves no doubt about whether the social engineer has a malicious 
intent and design to achieving his goal.  Illegitimate persuasion’s definition, however, does 
not define a malicious intent to this degree.  While social engineering’s definition definitely 
implies a malicious intent and illegitimate persuasion’s definition does not, the fundamental 
premise to both is deception.  When developing a training program against social 
engineering, the goal of that program is to get the user/participant to recognize when they are 
being deceived, so finding that deception is fundamental to illegitimate persuasion as well is 
positive, and allows the next comparison to be made.   
4.3  Comparing Objectives and Targets 
 
Next, an examination was made on the relationship between the objectives and targets of 
illegitimate persuasion and social engineering.  In all three of their experiments, Sagarin and 
his colleagues had their participants examine full-page color advertisements from periodical 
magazines with authority figures peddling their products (Sagarin et al., 2002).  The objective 
of illegitimate persuasion in the context in which Sagarin describes it (advertising) is to 
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convince the individual who receives the message to purchase a particular product or service.  
The distinction between a legitimate and illegitimate advertisement was made based on 
whether the individual recommending the product had reasonable credentials to do so.  For 
example, a model dressed as a stockbroker recommending the Wall Street Journal was 
labeled as an illegitimate authority, as he was not an expert on the product he was trying to 
sell.  Alternately, a legitimate authority was seen as someone who did have expert credentials 
for the product they were selling, such as Marcel Cockaerts, President of Kredietbank, 
Brussels recommending insurance for banks (Sagarin et al., 2002).  Social engineering’s 
objective by definition is to convince an individual to voluntarily give away some sort of 
access or critical information.  The objectives of social engineering and illegitimate 
persuasion clearly cannot be equated on this basis, however breaking the objectives down to 
their core may allow for a more direct comparison.  Illegitimate persuasion and social 
engineering both seek to compel behavior that the individual likely would not have taken 
otherwise.  The desired behavior of the recipient is different, but ultimately the objective of 
both is to persuade and individual to take an action, and in that way the objectives are very 
much aligned.  So, while the objectives of illegitimate persuasion and social engineering are 
not exactly alike, they do appear to be similar enough that it still stands to reason that 
research shown to be effective in bolstering a resistance to illegitimate persuasion can be 
applied to social engineering.  Once the objectives were compared, the next step was to 
examine the targets. 
The target of an illegitimate persuasion attempt is the advertising audience at which the 
marketing campaign is directed.  In the experiments that Sagarin and his colleagues ran, the 
targets that were chosen to be subject to illegitimate and legitimate authority advertisements 
included the demographic of undergraduate college students (Sagarin et al., 2002).  
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Advertisements are often targeted to reach a very specific demographic, and the 
advertisements reflect the values and desires of the targeted demographic.  The target of a 
social engineering attack is an individual with specific information (or access to that 
information) that the social engineer desires.  A social engineer may target a specific 
individual, or may “shotgun” an attack out to a broad audience.  The latter example describes 
when a social engineer’s target is most like the target of an advertisement that uses 
illegitimate persuasion.  However, because the social engineer’s only target may be a specific 
individual and the goal of an advertisement is to reach as broad an audience as possible 
within a given demographic, the targets of social engineering and illegitimate persuasion 
cannot be completely equated.  Indeed, the targets of the persuasion attempt may be the 
single biggest difference between illegitimate persuasion and social engineering.  For the 
purposes of applying the techniques of bolstering resistance to illegitimate persuasion to 
social engineering, this difference is acceptable because the techniques are not exclusive to a 
particular demographic or class of individuals.  At this point, a comparison has been made 
between the definitions, objectives, and targets of illegitimate persuasion and social 
engineering.  Next, comparison was made between the methods of the two.  
4.4   Comparing Methods & Techniques 
 
Sagarin’s research on bolstering resistance focused on the methods used to illegitimately 
persuade, so in order to be able to apply his methods of bolstering resistance to social 
engineering, the methods used to accomplish both were compared.  The psychological 
aspects of two specific examples of illegitimate persuasion were evaluated to determine if 
they fall within one of the known psychological triggers of social engineering (Gragg, 2003).  
If the techniques used in these illegitimate persuasion examples use Cialdini’s principles of 
persuasion that have been equated to Gragg’s psychological triggers from social engineering, 
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then the techniques that have been shown to be effective in bolstering an individual’s 
resistance to illegitimate persuasion should be effective against those same principles when 
the desire is to prevent social engineering.   
4.4.1  Authority Techniques   
 
When describing the techniques on how to bolster an individual’s resistance to 
illegitimate persuasion, Sagarin and his colleagues used two types of situations to dispel the 
individual’s illusion of invulnerability (Sagarin et al., 2002).  In the first example, the first of 
a series of three experiments gave the participants rules about determining the legitimacy of 
authority-based appeals and investigated whether or not that led to an increase in resistance 
against illegitimate appeals.  The first experiment measured the participants’ resistance 
immediately after being shown the difference between illegitimate and legitimate 
advertisements, while the second experiment repeated the first experiment and measured the 
participant’s responses after one to four days.  The third experiment differed from the 
previous two in that, when a participant incorrectly described the illegitimate authority as 
legitimate, the error was pointed out to the participant.  What all three of these experiments 
had in common was that each asked the participants to differentiate between a legitimate 
authority figure, such as a doctor recommending a pain killer; and an illegitimate authority 
figure, such as an actor dressed as a stock broker recommending a particular trading firm.  
This persuasion appeal clearly uses Cialdini’s principle of authority as it appeals to the idea 
that the individual recommending the product has a clear, demonstrated expertise in the 
domain of the advertisement.  Similarly, social engineers use an appeal to authority, which 
has already been linked to Cialdini’s persuasion principle of authority through Gragg’s 
trigger of authority, to manipulate a victim into giving up sensitive information.  A classic 
example of a social engineer using authority is when they claim to be technical support, either 
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over the phone or in person.  Because the dispelling of illusion of invulnerability techniques 
were shown to be most effective at instilling a resistance against an authority-based 
illegitimate persuasion attempt and because the persuasion principle of authority and the 
social engineering trigger of authority have been shown to be one and the same, those same 
dispelling of illusion techniques should also be effective at instilling a resistance against the 
social engineering trigger of authority. 
4.4.2  Scarcity Techniques 
 
In a different study on illegitimate persuasion, the principle of persuasion that the study 
focused on building a resistance against was the principle of scarcity (Coutinho and Sagarin, 
2007).  In this experiment, Coutinho and Sagarin examined how participants responded to 
legitimate and illegitimate claims of scarcity, and determined whether the principles of 
dispelling the illusion of invulnerability would be as effective as in the experiment done on 
authority.  The experiment gave the participants the rule that in order for there to be a 
legitimate claim of scarcity, it must be apparent that the object could not be produced 
anymore (such as coins from the 1800s).  The experiment used Cialdini’s persuasion 
principle of scarcity to elicit an emotional response from the target that created a sense of 
urgency to purchase the item.  For the experiment, participants were randomly assigned into 
four groups and each participant was given a series of six advertisements, balanced with three 
illegitimate scarcity claims and three legitimate scarcity claims.  The four groups were then 
assigned one of the four following conditions: the control group which received no training; 
the asserted vulnerability group, which received guidance on how to distinguish between a 
legitimate scarcity claim and an illegitimate scarcity claim, but received no demonstration of 
their personal vulnerability, and were not surveyed on how convincing they found the 
advertisement; the asserted vulnerability with inquiry condition group which was the same as 
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the asserted vulnerability group, with the exception they were surveyed on how convincing 
they found each advertisement; and the demonstrated vulnerability treatment group, which 
were surveyed on how convincing they found the advertisement, and were then told they had 
been fooled by any illegitimate advertisement they found convincing and given training on 
how to distinguish between an illegitimate scarcity claim and a legitimate one.  A summary 
of the assigned group and the conditions given to each is shown in Figure 4.  
 
FIGURE 4: SCARCITY EXPERIMENT GROUPS AND TREATMENTS 
 
After reading the training material, participants then rated six more advertisements to 
assess on how persuasive the advertisement was and how much the participant perceived an 
undo manipulative intent.  Again, these advertisements were balanced with three legitimate 
scarcity claims and three illegitimate scarcity claims.  The result of the experiment found that 
the participants of the demonstrated vulnerability treatment group were far more resistant to 
scarcity claims than the participants of the other groups.  This confirms the results of the 
earlier experiments using the principle of authority.  As shown above, the scarcity principle 
of persuasion can be equated to the strong affect trigger of social engineering, and so the 
results of this experiment should be able to be extended towards instilling a resistance to 
social engineering.  Furthermore, the result from this experiment suggests that the technique 
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of dispelling an individual’s illusion of invulnerability is necessary to instill a resistance to 
any of the principles of persuasion, and by extension, the triggers of social engineering. 
4.5 The Conclusion:  Illegitimate Persuasion = Social Engineering 
 
While illegitimate persuasion and social engineering cannot be exactly equated, the 
principles of persuasion are very similar to the psychological triggers of social engineering, 
and it reasonably follows that techniques that have been shown to be effective at reducing an 
individual’s resistance to illegitimate persuasion will also be effective in reducing an 
individual’s vulnerability to social engineering.  By extension, it follows that a combination 
of comprehensive security policies, combined with training that incorporates into its 
curriculum a dispelling of an individual’s illusion of invulnerability, is fundamental and 
necessary to protecting an organization from being exploited by social engineering attacks.  
The application of this conclusion to social engineering represents a significant paradigm 
shift on how information security specialists approach the task of training users to resist 
social engineering attacks.  Rather than simply educating users on the dangers and methods 
of social engineers, the individual needs to be exposed to training that demonstrates that 
user’s personal vulnerability in order for the training to be effective.  The question then 
becomes: How do you design a training program that is effective in demonstrating to the user 
their personal vulnerability to a social engineering attack? 
 
  
31 
V.  Discussion 
 
The previous chapter focused on determining whether or not illegitimate persuasion could be 
equated to social engineering.  This chapter examines the principles necessary to apply these 
principles to a training program that instills a resistance to social engineering.  The 
Constructivist Learning Theory is reviewed as it was a suggested method by Coutinho and 
Sagarin as a potential training technique that would be well suited to the task of incorporating 
the principle of dispelling the illusion of invulnerability into a training program (Coutinho 
and Sagarin, 2007).  Other potential training techniques are also reviewed for their potential 
applicability.  Then the requisite skill level described by Bloom’s Taxonomy that an 
individual would need to be trained up to is examined.  Finally, some suggested methods that 
incorporate training techniques with the requisite skill level, and that apply the principle of 
dispelling the illusion of invulnerability training are given.   
5.1   Constructivist Theory and Its Applicability 
 
Coutinho and Sagarin argued that a training program built on the Constructivist Learning 
Theory was the best way of building a training program built on the technique of dispelling 
an individual’s illusion of invulnerability (Coutinho and Sagarin, 2007).  This approach does 
seem logical as the Constructivist Learning Theory is built on the premise that students learn 
through experience and that each new experience builds on their own existing knowledge 
learned from experience.  A training program based on this learning theory would use the 
dispelling the illusion of invulnerability technique to construct a new experience or set of 
experiences that would build on the trainee’s own set of experiences by demonstrating that 
individual’s specific vulnerability.   Training based on the Constructivist Learning Theory 
would incorporate examples of social engineering into scenarios based on each of the seven 
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different psychological triggers, and then build on those triggers by demonstrating common 
ways the triggers can be used in combination.  An example of such a combination might be 
using the strong affect trigger to get a small commitment from an individual to give up an 
innocuous bit of information, and then exploiting that commitment by using the trigger of 
integrity and consistency to gain access to information that is more protected.  A training 
program that incorporates scenarios such as this into its curriculum would give the individual 
receiving the training the opportunity to construct a new set of experiences that he or she 
would retain and apply in their day-to-day life and job. 
5.2  Other Training Techniques 
 
While the principle of dispelling the illusion of invulnerability may be best implemented 
by techniques build on the Constructivist Learning Theory, it would be impractical to build a 
scenario for each possible technique that an individual might be approached by someone 
attempting to perpetrate a social engineering attack.  Such training should serve as a 
technique to make the individual more receptive to an education that also incorporates pattern 
recognition and the ability to evaluate a situation for its potential for a social engineering 
attack to take place.  Current methods of informing individuals on the threat of social 
engineering as well as the techniques used by social engineers certainly have their place in a 
training program designed to reduce an individual’s vulnerability to social engineering.   
5.3  Bloom’s Taxonomy, Its Revision, and Its Applicability 
 
It should also be considered as to what level of skill is necessary for an individual to gain 
as a result of going through a training program designed to instill a resistance to social 
engineering.  Bloom’s Taxonomy is a universally recognized framework for classifying what 
is expected of students as the result of instruction.  Bloom’s Taxonomy describes the 
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following six levels of competency, in order from lowest to highest complexity: knowledge, 
comprehension, application, analysis, synthesis, and evaluate.  In 2001, Krathwohl introduced 
a revised version of Bloom’s Taxonomy that changed the terms into gerunds to better 
describe the expected ability of the student at each level, and swapped the order of synthesis 
and evaluate, as synthesis is widely regarded as the highest level of competency an individual 
can achieve (Krathwohl, 2002).  Krathwohl’s revision of Bloom’s Taxonomy describes the 
following six levels of competency in order of complexity, from lowest to highest: remember, 
understand, apply, analyze, evaluate, and create.  A comparison of the original taxonomy and 
Krathwohl’s revision can be seen in Figure 5.   
 
FIGURE 5: BLOOM’S ORIGINAL AND REVISED TAXONOMY (LOWEST TO HIGHEST) 
Currently, the typical educational program for preventing a social engineering attack 
expects its students to leave simply with an increased awareness about the techniques and 
tactics that social engineers employ.  In the revised taxonomy, the level of competency that 
such programs teach to is the understand level.  While this initially seems sufficient, the 
implications of Sagarin’s and Coutinho’s research described above are that rule-giving is not 
enough, and that it must be demonstrated to the individual that they are personally vulnerable.   
This demonstration actually educates the user to a higher level of competency, the evaluate 
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competency.  Once their vulnerability has been demonstrated for them, the individual can 
then make judgments based on established criteria and evaluate each new situation that is 
presented to them.  Therefore, the target level of competency for training that seeks to instill a 
resistance against social engineering should be the evaluate competency. 
5.4   What should be in a Training Program 
 
Security policies must be able to identify critical information that needs to be protected.  
Why the information is being protected must make sense to the user, and then formal rules 
must be put in place that forbids the user to release the identified critical information.  There 
must be “buy-in” from the user that there is an urgency to protect the information, and this 
can be achieved through training.  A potential training example might be to give the user a 
series of questions to determine whether or not specific information was ok to release.  The 
sample set should include obvious examples, such as username and password, and then 
innocuous examples such as the individual’s name and rank.   
User/employee training should include samples of behavior and information that might 
appear to be innocuous, but in fact are not.  When they incorrectly choose an action or 
information that has been identified as critical, the training should immediately demonstrate 
or present an historical example of how that that type of activity was used to perform 
malicious activities.  This type of training uses the technique of dispelling a user’s illusion of 
invulnerability to create a salient, teachable moment that can affect cognitive processes and 
ultimately their influence behavior so that they increase their vigilance.   
Critical to this training is that employees are demonstrated two things:  First, everyone, 
regardless of their position within the organization, is vulnerable to a range of social 
engineering techniques.  Secondly, each person must be made aware that the social engineer 
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is targeting people just like him or her.  The salience of the demonstration as well as evidence 
of the individual’s vulnerability will bolster that individual’s resistance to social engineering 
attacks in the future.  In order to effectively create a resistance to a variety of attacks, this 
technique should be demonstrated to the user across all the psychological triggers of social 
engineering. 
5.5  Limitations of Applicability & Potential for Future Research 
 
The finding of this thesis, and the effectiveness of any training program created to 
incorporate this research depends largely on the ability of previous research done on 
dispelling the illusion of invulnerability against two different principles of persuasion.  
Applying the principle of dispelling the illusion of invulnerability to principles of persuasion 
other than authority and scarcity has not been performed, and thus the potential exists that the 
techniques may not be effective against six principles, much less all seven psychological 
triggers.  With that said, more research is definitely required in this area.  
If a means of measuring an individual’s vulnerability to social engineering can be 
developed, then a study that verifies the effectiveness of this type of training when applied to 
social engineering would add validity to this study and to the transferability of Sagarin’s 
work to the problem of countering social engineering attacks.  Perhaps such research could 
incorporate methods of measuring resistance from Sagarin’s work and apply them to social 
engineering.  Research that measures an individual’s resistance prior to treatment, gives them 
a treatment, and then measures their resistance post treatment would help validate the 
concepts from this study.  A longitudinal study that determines the rate of decay of training, 
and how long the treatment is effective for would also be useful for determining how often 
individuals have to be subjected to training. 
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